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It is a common thought that logic is “topic neutral”, at least in the
sense that no matter what the subject of reasoning, logic should be a fit
tool for tackling it. One way of spelling out this idea is offered in a paper-
cum-manifesto published by Richard Routley1 in 1977, called ”Ultralogic as
Universal”, which is best known in its reprinted form as an appendix to Rout-
ley 1980a. (Page references will be to that appendix.) Routley argued that,
given the job of logic, the kind of logic we should adopt is a relatively proof-
theoretically weak relevant logic. While the paper was in part a discussion
of future avenues for logical investigation, Routley offered specific answers to
a range of foundational logical questions.
It is safe to say that Routley’s manifesto was not widely taken up, and
indeed the wider relevance/relevant logic tradition of which he was a part is
on the fringe of work on logic in philosophy departments as a whole these
days. However, the desiderata he points to should be of interest to philo-
sophical logicians whether or not they see themselves in Routley’s tradition,
and the arguments he gives for the features of his preferred logics should be
addressed by relevant and non-relevant logicians alike: those who do not wish
to follow his lead should articulate why. At any rate, since I feel the pull of
some of Routley’s desiderata, or at least something like them, I think it is
worth examining Routley’s criteria to think about what sorts of approaches
might satisfy them.
In this paper, I will take up three tasks in turn. The first is to set out
what Routley thought we should demand of an all-purpose universal logic,
and some of his reasons for those demands. The second is to sketch Routley’s
1In 1983 Routley changed his name to Richard Sylvan. In this paper I will refer to him
as Routley when discussing his views about ultralogic which he published under that name.
I should note that it is not clear whether he continued to hold these views: in Sylvan 1997,
he adopts a pluralism about logic, though it seems that his preferred “plurallism” may
still provide a privileged place for the sort of logic that he formerly defended as universal.
I will not attempt to relate his earlier views to his 1997 position here, however.
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own response to those demands. The third is to explore how else we could
satisfy some of the theoretical demands Routley identified, if we are not to
follow him in endorsing Routleyan Ultralogic as a foundational logic. As part
of this third project, I want to articulate what seems to me a preferable way
of going to respond to the challenges Routley correctly identifies: and while
I doubt what I will have to say would have convinced Routley himself, I will
try to show that the approach I prefer has several advantages over Routley’s.
1 The Tasks of a Universal Logic
Routley accepted (Routley 1980a p 986) that there were some special-purpose
logics for particular purposes. But he also thought there was one logic that
was privileged: that it was universal, and that it was the logic best suited for
“foundational studies” in metalogic, mathematics, linguistics and elsewhere.
Indeed, according to Routley, the best way to understand more local logics
is to see them as relying on deductive reasoning that could be made explicit
through reasoning in the universal logic with additional premises known (or
believed) to be true for the case at hand: much as intuitionist logicians
have sometimes suggested that classical logic can be recaptured by adding
as additional premises all instances of excluded middle.
This underlying logic was intended to apply wherever deductive reasoning
could be applied: he sought a logic that is “applicable in every situation
whether realised or not, possible or not... including illogical, inconsistent and
paradoxical ones” (Routley 1980a p 893). Many logics have adherents willing
to claim that they are the “one true logic”, but Routley criticised many
of the other obvious alternatives (such as systems incorporating classical
logic or intuitionistic logic) on the grounds that those logics failed for many
“deductive reasoning situations”. These include circumstances where we are
faced with inconsistent or incomplete bodies of information, reasoning about
paradoxes such as the Liar, and reasoning about the belief systems of non-
ideal agents. Some of Routley’s criticisms of other universal projects such as
classical logic will be discussed further below.
Routley did not simply assert that we should aim to have a universal
logic, so characterised. He offers a range of arguments for thinking that
adopting a universal logic is preferable, and against arguments that it is not
feasible (Routley 1980a pp 896-898). One kind of reason consists in drawing
attention to weaknesses of alternatives, particularly drawbacks of the view
that all logics are local. For example, one problem for the idea that there
is no universal logic, but that instead there are only subject-matter specific
logics, is that this sort of localism “runs into difficulties at... boundaries”. It
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struggles to explain how to do reasoning that involves premises from different
subject matters, or how to choose which logic to use when it is unclear what
area some information falls into.
Routley also deals with objections to the idea of a universal logic, in-
cluding the idea that for any logic we can find a sufficiently illogical situation
where it will break down. One might initially think that Routley’s demand is
that we find a universal logic that governs our reasoning whenever we reason,
or at least whenever we deductively reason (setting aside inductive reason-
ing, arguments from analogy, and other obviously ampliative cases).2 On
closer inspection, however, it turns out that the “deductive reasoning situa-
tions” may be a narrower class of circumstances to reason about than those.
Routley admits that “situations can always be found which fail to conform
to any specific logical principles” (Routley 1980a p 898). He does not there
give specific examples, but some cases which I think Routley would agree
are cases of this sort include reasoning about what someone in fact believes,
given that they believe a set of claims A1 through An: even if B is a fairly
uncontroversial consequence of A1 through An, actual believers do not always
draw such inferences. Or for an even clearer case, just because someone has
explicitly said A1 through An, it does not follow that they have explicitly said
B, no matter how secure a logical consequence B is of A1 through An. The
“situation” of the content of our believer’s beliefs or our asserter’s utterances
are situations we cannot suppose are closed under logical consequence.
When we engage in deductive reasoning that involves these situations,
Routley’s preferred way to make this reasoning explicit seems to be to cast
it in terms of formulating the reasoning using “highly intensional functors”
(p 898). So, for example, if I have a situation not closed under conjunction
elimination (an example Routley talks about elsewhere, when discussing a
fiction in which principles of connexive logic govern (Routley 1979 p 11-12)), I
will be able to make claims of the form “according to the fiction (A & ∼A)”,
while rejecting the corresponding claim “according to the fiction A “without
myself violating conjunction elimination: since when I represent “according
to the fiction” with an operator O, O(A & ∼A) need not have as a logical
consequence O(A), even if A & ∼A has A as a consequence.
It is worth addressing an ambiguity to be resolved in understanding Rout-
ley’s talk of “reasoning situations”. In one sense of “reasoning situation”, the
situation in question is one where the reasoner finds herself: with various
beliefs or pieces of evidence, subject to various cognitive and environmen-
2Routley himself may have thought we can recapture most or all apparently “inductive”
reasoning e.g. in science in a deductive framework: See e.g. Routley 1980a pp 946-949.
But let us leave such cases aside for the sake of a tractable discussion.
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tal constraints, and so on. In the other sense of “reasoning situation” the
situation in question is one in which the premises obtain – it may be a math-
ematical situation, a situation in the distant past, an inconsistent situation,
a situation in fiction, etc. It is clear from context that the reasoning situa-
tions Routley is concerned with are the second sort. He is concerned about
the range of topics or bodies of information logic should be applied to. This
talk can sound rather platonistic: why should there be a fictional situation,
just because there is a story, or a ‘belief situation’ just because there are
beliefs? For those with such scruples, I suspect this talk of situations can
be paraphrased away, in this discussion at least, by talking about collections
of propositions or bodies of information instead. I am inclined to commit-
ment to possible and impossible worlds and situations myself, so I think some
good sense can be made of talk of e.g. counterfactual situations or even im-
possible, inconsistent, or paradoxical situations. So I will follow Routley in
helping myself to the “situation” locution, including the slightly loose talk
of deduction or reasoning or a logic being about situations. (Even though I
think there are situations, I do not think that inferences are typically literally
about situations, as opposed to what the premises or conclusions are more
naturally taken to be about.)
The second requirement on a successful logic is that it be a “paradox
solvent”. A lot of work in philosophical logic in the last hundred years has
focused on constructing logics that satisfactorily handle standing puzzles,
and many proposed revisions to e.g. classical logic have been motivated
on the basis that they provide more satisfactory solutions to these puzzles.
(Among the “paradoxes” Routley thought it was important to address were
the “paradoxes of material implication” and the “paradoxes of strict impli-
cation” that motivate many conditional logics.) Note that to be a “paradox
solvent” a logic need not avoid all the conclusions of traditional paradoxes
that theorists have found distasteful. Routley, for example, advocated solu-
tions to the Liar paradox that treated the Liar sentence as being both true
and false (and indeed treated the truth and falsehood of the Liar sentence
as theorems of a suitable truth theory). He also defended the doctrine that
some things do not exist, which many have found an intolerable way out of
the puzzles about thought and talk of the non-existent. Being a “paradox
solvent” is presumably a matter of both being able to represent and derive
entailments from paradoxical sentences, and perhaps to provide the materials
to resolve paradoxes, or at least to do so when the paradox is one that arises
in logic or related areas. (If we include as “paradoxes” every case where
plausible premises lead to apparently unacceptable conclusions, it would be
odd to suppose that logic should provide the solution to all paradoxes.)
The third requirement is that the logic be sensitive to very fine-grained
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distinctions in the meanings of expressions. For example, it should not treat
as logically equivalent expressions which share a referent, or an extension: for
that matter, it should not treat as logically equivalent expressions that nec-
essarily co-designate. Furthermore, in Routley’s preferred logics, sentences
which logically entail each other are not intersubstitutable in all contexts
salva veritate. In the terminology introduced by Cresswell 1975, Routley’s
preferred logics are sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions between ex-
pressions. Routley himself preferred the expression “ultramodal” for logics
sensitive to these distinctions, and his label “ultralogic” for his preferred
logic stems from its sensitivity to ultramodal distinctions (Routley 1980a p
894). (The term “logically equivalent statements” is sometimes used to mean
expressions that are logically interderivable from each other, and sometimes
used to mean that they can be always substituted in any context salva veri-
tate. I will use the term sense of mutual interderivability in this paper, since
when it comes to fine-grained enough logical systems, the only expression
always substitutable salva veritate with a sentence s is s itself.)
A terminological aside: I am not sure why Routley preferred the expres-
sion “ultramodal”, but I have three conjectures. When the expression “hy-
perintensional” was first introduced, it was used both for contexts in which
logical equivalents could not be substituted salva veritate, but quickly also
came to apply to contexts where necessary equivalents could not be substi-
tuted salva veritate. This ambiguity led to few problems in practice, but
Routley may have thought an expression that unambiguously picked out the
latter would be desirable. The second is that it avoids an awkwardness in the
classifications “extensional”, “intensional” and “hyperintensional”: as they
are normally defined hyperintensional constructions are a subspecies of in-
tensional constructions, which leaves us no entirely convenient way of saying
that a particular construction is intensional while not being hyperintensional
(“merely intensional”). Routley seems to have used “modal” to pick out the
intermediate category of non-extensional constructions that are not ultra-
modal (see p 894 n 0), thus more clearly delineating the three categories of
interest. The third is based on an observation of Max Cresswell’s (personal
communication): “hyperintension” commits the etymological sin of mixing
Greek and Latin roots, while “ultramodal” is a more respectable Latinism.
Whatever the reason for Routley’s terminological suggestion, “ultramodal”
has not become a mainstream alternative to “hyperintensional”.
There are a number of areas where we would not want to be able to
substitute necessarily equivalent expressions unrestrictedly. Propositional
attitude contexts are one well known case: knowing one mathematical truth
does not mean one knows every other mathematical truth equivalent to it,
and there is more than one way to believe something impossible. If Kripke
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is right, “it is a priori that...” does not allow unrestricted substitutions of
necessary equivalents, since some necessary truths are a priori truths but
others are not. And so on for a growing list of cases. (See Nolan 2014 for a
recent partial list.)
Of particular significance in this context is the fact that Routley also
thought it was important to be able to represent in a logic facts about en-
tailment: i.e. facts about what followed from what. An arrow formula
that is meant to represent entailment should not allow for substitution of
necessary equivalents, since necessary equivalents will have different logical
consequences. Presumably logical axioms are all meant to be true and indeed
necessarily true: but in axiomatic logics with more than one, non-redundant,
axiom, one axiom will not be an entailment of any of the others, even though
it will typically be an entailment of itself. So a device to represent entailment
relationships should be “ultramodal”. It is particularly desirable to be able
to represent entailment relations in a logic intended to be universal, since a
universal logic must be able to represent deductions about its own features,
on pain of logic being silent about those deductive relationships altogether.
2 Routley’s Proposal For Meeting Those De-
mands
Routley had a specific proposal for what form this universal, all-purpose
logic should take. Three aspects of this proposal stand out. It should be
relevant : that is, it should fall in the family of “relevant” or “relevance”
logics explored in e.g. Routley et al. 1983. (Routley 1980a pp 898-900)
It should be “dialectical”: that is, it should accept the existence of true
contradictions (pp 916-919). (This is a feature that Routley and Graham
Priest would later label dialetheist.) It should be ultramodal (p 894), not
treating necessarily equivalent expressions as logically equivalent (e.g. in a
logic of belief, it should not follow from someone’s believing one necessary
truth that she believes any other arbitrary necessary truth. So even when A
and B express necessary truths, we cannot freely substitute them to go from
“Ann believes A” to “Ann believes B”). Another condition that Routley
would no doubt impose on an ultralogic is that it would have “neutral”
quantification, quantifying over objects that do not exist as well as those
that do: and while this is the central theme of Exploring Meinong’s Jungle,
where “Ultralogic is Universal” appears as an appendix, it does not come
in for discussion in the latter work, so I will leave it aside for the current
discussion.
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Characterising what it is for a logic to be a “relevant” or “relevance”
logic is not entirely easy or uncontroversial. One popular characterisation of
the propositional relevant logics is that all of the theorem arrow-formulas of
the language “share variables”: no propositional variable in the consequents
of the theorems fails to appear in the antecedent. Routley himself favoured
a characterisation in terms of “sufficiency” of antecedents to consequents
in entailments (p 895-6), though this characterisation (and the suggestion
that other logics do not have premises sufficient for their conclusions without
supplementation with other information) is obviously tendentious. When
explaining the superiority of relevant logics as candidates to be a universal
logic, Routley leaned heavily on the advantages of being paracomplete and
paraconsistent: offering the logical possibility of truth-value gaps and truth-
value gluts.
The sentential logic that is at the core of Routley’s proposed logic for
mathematics, at least, is one he calls DK (p 918), to which he adds quantifi-
cational principles, principles for identity, principles governing set member-
ship, and other devices. DK is a weak relevant logic: it is significantly weaker
than R, the relevant logic Routley (along with a number of others) is most
associated with, since DK lacks contraction. (It is similar to, but slightly
weaker than, the “dialectical logic” of Routley and Meyer 1976). As I read
him, he would think DK is still too strong to be the sentential fragment of
his ultimate ultralogic: he notes that doing justice to incompleteness requires
more weakening of its axioms (p 919).3 Routley does not explicitly endorse
a candidate ultralogic in the paper, so far as I can determine. I imagine his
preferred option would lie somewhere between the strength of DK, just men-
tioned, and a very weak relevant logic like B (see Routley et al. 1983).4 For
applications, of course, additional premises or premise schemas will often be
needed, and much of Routley 1980a involves sketching how we might recover
the desirable parts of e.g. classical mathematics with underlying logics much
weaker than classical logic.
In arguing that a universal logic should be “dialectical”, Routley intends
two things. One is that it is paraconsistent : that it should not enable the
derivation of arbitrary formulas from a contradiction. The other is that the
3Ross Brady has suggested to me that despite the misgiving mentioned here, Routley
might still have preferred DK for an ultralogic on balance (personal communication).
4Thanks to discussion with Ross Brady and David Ripley here, who convinced me that
Routley would likely want a stronger sentential basis than B. One possibility is that he
would have endorsed the logic DJ, as discussed e.g. in Brady 1996. Thanks to discussion
with Ross Brady and Zach Weber about which logical systems Routley would have en-
dorsed for an ultralogic. My own view is that he was undecided on the best option at the
time of writing.
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logic should be dialethic: it should admit the existence of contradictions that
are in fact true. (In some dialethic logics including a truth predicate, includ-
ing ones Routley favoured, some contradictions are even logical theorems.)
An important commonly mentioned motive for this is for a logic that will
satisfactorily handle the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes, such as the
Liar, paradoxes of designation such as Grelling and Nelson’s “heterological”
paradox, and set theoretic paradoxes like Russell’s or Burali-Forti’s. If we
just accept that Liar sentences are both true and false, and both true-and-
not-true, accept that “heterological” both is and is not heterological, that
the Russell set both belongs to itself and does not, we can preserve relatively
naive theories of truth, designation, membership, and so on. But another
motive Routley mentions that bears specifically on a logic’s pretensions to
universality is our ability to reason non-trivially about rival solutions to
paradoxes like these. We want to be able to consider solutions which postu-
late inconsistency or incompleteness hypothetically without our hypothetical
reasoning being trivial or otherwise collapsing, and according to Routley
non-paraconsistent logics “simply rule out proper logical examinations of in-
complete and inconsistent deductive theories, in particular of non-vacuous
incomplete theories where not all logical laws hold, and of non-trivial incon-
sistent theories where some contradictory propositions hold” (Routley 1980a
p 898). Even before we decide whether these theories are correct, we must be
able to investigate them and reason about situations in which they obtain.
A logic that throws up its hands when exploring these theories does not have
a wide enough range of application, or so Routley argues.
Finally, it should not be a surprise that if we specify that one of the jobs
of a universal logic is to enable us to deductively reason in a way that we can
distinguish necessary equivalents and logical equivalents, then a logic that
will adequately fit that bill will itself be “ultramodal” or hyperintensional.
We have already seen above some of the reasons to want a logic that can
handle hyperintensional constructions. Routley was keen on logics of belief
that allow us to distinguish necessarily equivalent beliefs; logics of significance
which do not run together necessarily equivalent but non-synonymous expres-
sions; counterfactuals which are not trivially true when their antecedents are
impossible, and so on. At the time of writing Routley 1980a he projected
writing a book with Valerie Plumwood (then Valerie Routley) with the title
Beyond the Possible (p 961 note 29): that title sums up a significant portion
of Routley’s logical work.5
5Zach Weber tells me that the footnote cited of Routley’s might have been superseded
by events by 1980, and that the projected “Beyond the Possible” work was just the single-
authored Exploring Meinong’s Jungle itself.
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3 Alternatives to Routley’s Proposal
While few have endorsed a one true logic along the lines of Routley’s Ul-
tralogic, each one of the desiderata he outlines (universality, being a paradox
solvent, and being ultramodal/hyperintensional) are of wide appeal. The
demand for a universal logic has been traditionally popular, and for good
reasons. For one thing, it has seemed to many that logic is a universal part
of method: that when premises and conclusions are in the right logical form,
they stand in the corresponding deductive relationships, and logic does not
suddenly break down when applied to some areas of human inquiry rather
than others. It has a track record as a go-anywhere science. For another, the
meanings of logical particles such as “and” or “if” do not seem to be wildly
ambiguous: if there are important commonalities whenever they are used,
these include some commonalities in the inferential behaviour of sentences
they occur in.
A final reason to look for a universal logic has been touched on above. We
need to be able to reason about the relationships between different subject
areas, and if we lacked a logic that applied across different topics, it is very
hard to see how we could do this. That’s not yet an argument that a universal
logic is to be had: perhaps it just turns out that we are cosmically unlucky
and there is no logic-like way to reason across domains of inquiry. But at least
insofar as we think we can and do reason using premises from all manner of
subject matters to conclusions in other subject matters (perhaps via “mixed”
conditional claims or other “mixed” compound expressions), we have a reason
to think there is some logical structure underlying the information we have
across domains.
The demand for a logic that is a “paradox solvent”, or is at least paradox-
resistant, is also hard to resist. After all, if we endorse a logic that leads to
incorrect conclusions from correct premises, we are stuck with being incor-
rect. Furthermore, the apparent consequences of some paradoxes are espe-
cially absurd. Endorsing a trivial theory which entails every proposition,
or endorsing every claim employing vague language that is the conclusion
of some sorites argument, would be to indulge in intolerable absurdity. If
we are to use logic when talking of truth, or employing vague expressions,
or any other area where paradoxes dwell, we do not want limitations of the
logic to lead us astray. I doubt we should demand that logic itself resolve
the problem whenever we have apparently acceptable premises leading to an
apparently unacceptable conclusion: sometimes we should just reject one of
the premises or be led to embrace the conclusion. So insisting that our logical
theory be the source of solutions to all paradoxes would be too extreme. But
at the very least we should demand that our logical systems and the theory
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associated with them avoid, defuse or diagnose logical paradoxes. It is hard
to see where else, besides our broadly logical inquiries, we should be looking
to resolve them.
Finally, our deductive reasoning had better be capable of drawing hy-
perintensional distinctions. As discussed above, there are many different
important constructions that do not permit substitution of necessary equiva-
lents: and if we are to understand their roles in deductive inferences, it seems
we must admit hyperintensionality into our logical formalism as well.
Routley offers one kind of approach that holds out the promise of a uni-
versal, paradox-free, ultramodal/hyperintensional logic. In this section I will
look briefly at three rival ways we could try to secure the logical benefits
Routley seeks without employing his methods. It may be that these three
alternatives are not exhaustive, though they seem to me to cover most of the
available options.
3.1 Traditional Universal Logics
An alternative that would act as a head-on response to Routley’s criteria
would be to offer a rival logic that was universal, came with a suite of solu-
tions to paradoxes, and which made enough discriminations to handle rea-
soning about all manner of apparently hyperintensional matters. There are
many potential ways to do this. One conservative way would be to argue
that much more restricted resources were needed to handle every reason-
ing situation. One conservative approach would be to insist that classical
logic, suitably extended, is all the logic we need, and that standard modal
resources are enough to understand all the reasoning we need to do, even
when hyperintensional resources are apparently called for.
Ordinary unvarnished classical logic does not allow for unrestricted sub-
stitution of necessary equivalents: even if “2 is a number” or “water is H2O”
are necessary truths, their straightforward formalisations are not interderiv-
able. Modal logics weaker, particularly those weaker than S5, do not allow for
arbitrary substitution of formulas even when we add as premises that those
formulas are necessary: in many models of T, for example, some necessary
formulas are possibly not-necessary, while others are necessarily necessary.
So when Routley complains that logics like this are not “ultramodal”, he pre-
sumably has something else in mind besides the demand that logics should
not allow unrestricted substitution of necessary equivalents. Two aspects of
his complaint are that many logics treat contradictions as uniformly false
(and, in modal logics, necessarily false), and that the philosophy around
the meanings of philosophically interesting expressions was dominated by
approaches which conflated impossibilities.
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Logics that extend classical logic, intuitionistic logic, or straightforward
logics of truth-value gaps such as strong Kleene logic are all in Routley’s
sights. Formulating an inconsistent theory, e.g. of the Liar or naive set
theory, and closing it under any of these three logics produces triviality,
since in all of these any conclusion can be validly deduced from a formal
contradiction. They do not appear to offer good frameworks for working out
better or worse ways of developing inconsistent theories, since they treat all
formally inconsistent theories as equivalent and trivial. They also struggle to
represent failures of excluded middle: even though intuitionism and strong
Kleene both have model theories with truth value gaps and do not have
excluded middle as theorems, attempting to state that there is a failure of
excluded middle in either logic is not straightforward. (∼ (A∨ ∼A) is just
equivalent to (∼A & ∼∼A) in both.) Not even being able to sensibly reason
using inconsistent or some incomplete theories is one mark against them, in
Routley’s book.
It is possible to resist the need for any hyperintensional operators in an
overall adequate theory, and the meaningfulness of hyperintensional opera-
tors is called into question by some influential traditions in philosophy. After
the eclipse of extensionalism (which was far from dead when Routley was
writing in 1977), perhaps the main systematic challenge to making sense of
hyperintensionality has come from the possible worlds semantics championed
by figures such as Richard Montague, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.
According to this approach meanings of different expressions can be built up
as functions from possible objects and possible worlds: names and definite
descriptions as functions from worlds to objects, ordinary predicates as func-
tions from worlds to extensions in those worlds, sentences as functions from
worlds to truth values, or alternatives sets of worlds, and so on. According to
the most straightforward versions of possible worlds semantics, the meanings
of necessarily co-referring names are identical, the meanings of necessarily
co-applying predicates are identical, and the meanings of necessarily equiv-
alent sentences are identical. If a language is compositional, distinctions
between necessary equivalents get collapsed: if Robin Hood and Robin of
Locksley are necessarily the same, then “The sheriff seeks Robin Hood” and
“The sheriff seeks Robin of Locksley” will be synonymous. Once we treat
constructions like “Beth believes that...” as sentential operators, Beth will
believe the logical equivalents of everything she believes. Who knew discov-
ering mathematical identities was so easy? Impossible propositions all make
the same contribution to truth values of constructions which have them as
constituents, as well. So, for example, any counterfactual containing an im-
possible antecedent will have the same truth value as a counterfactual with
the same consequent and different impossible antecedent, at least if the coun-
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terfactual construction is treated as operating on propositions expressed by
antecedents and consequents.
Defenders of possible worlds semantics have tried a variety of techniques
to keep to the letter of their view while trying to preserve the appearance of
hyperintensionality. One is to adapt a manoeuvre Quine and Davidson em-
ployed when defending extensionalism and rely on the distinction between
use and mention. Stalnaker, for example, suggests that we attribute belief
or knowledge of some mathematical truths but not others to people despite
there only being one necessarily true mathematical proposition, because at-
tribution of mathematical beliefs (and perhaps many other beliefs) relies for
their truth not just on what the proposition is that would be expressed by
the expression following “believes that”, and what propositions the person
believes, but also on facts about the relationship between mathematical sen-
tences and the person (Stalnaker 1984 pp 73-75). In some perhaps extended
sense, these attributions are about the expressions displayed as well as what
they mean.
This device can also be used to discuss the apparent hyperintensionality
of resources used in a theory of logic itself. Not everything formally entails an
arbitrary necessary truth. Does it follow that “entails” (or “logically entails”)
is hyperintensional? Not automatically. If “entails” is not a propositional
operator, but a predicate that expresses a relation between sentences, or
logical forms, or somesuch, then “2+2=4 entails 2+2=4” need not mean
the same as “2+2=4 entails water is H2O”, since the latter talks about the
sentence “water is H2O” (or some structure akin to the sentence). Or at
least this is a natural move to make if one holds, on theoretical grounds, that
“water is H2O” and “2+2=4” share the same meaning.
Here is not the place to engage in a sustained critique of these approaches.
The idea that we cannot make sense of impossibilities or reason cogently
about them is not initially appealing, though enough years of training can
presumably make it look natural or even unavoidable. The devices for in-
terpreting belief as only about possibility, or being somehow metalinguistic,
or entailment claims as surreptitiously mentioning sentences, also seem pro-
crustean. In principle, it may be worth living with these limitations for
a theory that is simple enough, or explanatory enough, or otherwise has
weighty considerations in its favour. Whether or not the possibilities-only
paradigm is sufficiently ahead of alternatives is something to be decided on
the basis of examining how it does vis a vis its rivals across a range of specific
areas.6 My own view is that it is less satisfactory than taking hyperinten-
6I discuss the prospects of extensionalist and possible-worlds-semantics approaches to
apparently hyperintensional phenomena in more detail in Nolan 2014.
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sionality more at face value, and allowing for greater generosity about our
ability to reasonably manage our thought and claims about impossibilities.
But I doubt there is much that can be said quickly to dislodge theorists who
wish to stick to their guns. Let us then look at two alternatives to this tradi-
tional approach of sticking with a strong logic and avoiding hyperintensional
operators in our theory of deductive reasoning.
3.2 Pluralism
Another alternative is give up the universal pretensions of logic. We could do
this by deeming some topics permanently off-limits for logical investigation,
but a less radical approach would be to adopt a logical pluralism, according to
which for every reasoning situation there is at least one correct logic for that
situation, but there is no useful logic correct for every reasoning situation.
Instead of a single universal logic, a pluralist can offer a patchwork of different
principles for different occasions. (No doubt there are other motivations for
logical pluralism, and logical pluralists need not think that logics are topic-
specific in this way: but I am interested here in appealing to logical pluralism
as an alternative to adopting a universal logic, as opposed to other reasons
one might wish to endorse pluralism.7) Note the negative claim, that there
is no go-anywhere logic, is important to pluralism as I am construing it here
(though others may of course use the word “pluralism” differently.) Even
a believer in a universal logic may agree that there is a plurality of correct
“logics” for different reasoning situations which differ from the universal logic,
if we can recover those logics by adding some premises to a universal logic
or otherwise treating local logics as special cases of the universal one.
Pluralists are likely to resist the demand that the logic we use for “foun-
dational” investigations be its own meta-logic, at least if this is a general
demand: the topic of logic itself might well be different from the topics suit-
able for other logics! Avoiding “logical closure” is also a way to avoid a
range of paradoxes of self-reference. Pluralists cannot avoid these paradoxes
altogether, at least if they accept that there are some language/logic combi-
nations that can talk about themselves, or talk about truth in general, etc.,
but at least pluralists can hope to take a more divide-and-conquer approach
if they are not constrained to always allow logics are their own meta-logics.
Pluralists also have open to them, as a general approach, allowing that dif-
7The kinds of logical pluralism I am exploring here can be contrasted with the kind of
logical pluralism defended by Beall and Restall 2006: their pluralism gives us a family of
logics that can be used with any premises whatever, but deliver different results and are
supposed to be fit for different purposes. The pluralisms I am interested in yield collections
of logics each of which should only be applied to some subject matters.
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 3.8
420
ferent systems can have different features we would like our theory-plus-logic
to have, and may hope to defuse paradoxes by conceding that different log-
ics have different features we want, even if those features are never found
together in a legitimate logic. Pluralists are unlikely to object to allowing
that at least some logical systems are ultramodal, even if they wish to also
allow that some logics are e.g. entirely extensional. So pluralists have some
options that seem to be denied to the universalist.
Pluralists have a lot of room to move in dealing with the problems we
want a theory of logic to solve. And there are enough potential pluralist
options that I would be foolhardy to try to evaluate them all here, let alone
to even try to show that they are all unsatisfactory compared to adopting
a universal logic. But there are a few general drawbacks that pluralism has
that make a search for a universal logic worthwhile, it seems to me. For
one thing, as Routley noted, there are puzzles about how to understand all
our deductive reasoning together, especially if conclusions in one area bear
on questions in another. For another, it is likely that a pluralistic theory of
logic will be less unified and less simple than its universalist rivals. Instead
of a single logic (supplemented by additional premises when necessary), a
pluralist will have several or perhaps many different logical systems which
correctly describe reasoning in different areas, plus a superstructure of theory
saying which system properly applies where, together with the appropriate
explanations of why, and how to manage inferences that “mix” premises or
sub-arguments from different areas. A unified and simpler theory of valid
inference should be preferred, everything else being equal.8
Finally, pluralism seems initially implausible. Treating logic as describing
unrestricted validity seems to have enjoyed some success over the history
of the subject, and it is difficult to see in the case of particular inferences
which are candidates for validities in one case how they could fail to be valid
elsewhere due to a change of subject matter. How could A & B be true
without A?
A closely related option would be to embrace “logical nihilism” and deny
that either universal logic or plural, local logics are successful in their job
description. If taken as an entirely general claim, this would be a difficult
position to establish, given the pedestrian purposes logic is sometimes put to:
surely some bodies of information are regimented in a way so that e.g. they
are closed under conjunction? If so, using some ordinary logical principles
when dealing with that information seems an innocuous enough way to pass
from truths to other truths.9 An interesting position in the vicinity would be
8I note that Routley also approved of making the choice between logical theories on
the basis of theoretical virtues: see Routley 1980b.
9Though for a sympathetic discussion of such a general logical nihilism, see Russell
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 3.8
421
some form of local logical nihilism: not denying that all logics are everywhere
inapplicable, but rather than there are some subject matters unfit for logic.
These might be the content of fiction, or the content of mental states, or
theology, or ethics, or the deliverances of mystical experience, or whatever.
If some domains escape the applicability of logic, that could relieve us of the
dilemma of either searching for principles that governed those domains as well
as others, or specifying a local logic of that subject and how it related to local
logics of other domains. I don’t myself think that either global logical nihilism
or even this partial logical nihilism are very appealing options compared to
rival approaches, in the end, so I will not stop to develop the option more
here.
None of this is intended to be a knock-down refutation of pluralism (or of
nihilism for that matter). Pluralism in particular remains a live alternative
to the quest for a single go-anywhere logic, and potentially avoids some of
the challenges the postulation of a universal logic faces.
3.3 Reasoning in the Scope of Ultramodal Operators
The final alternative I see to an Ultralogic along the lines of Routley’s pro-
posal is to seek a universal logic, but to understand many of our “reasoning
situations” in a different way from Routley. It is to treat a lot of our rea-
soning as implicitly from premises prefixed by ultramodal operators to con-
clusions also prefixed by those operators. In effect, it is to treat much more
of our reasoning, even logical-looking reasoning, as involving “non-deductive
situations” in Routley’s sense of that expression. There are well behaved
situations, such as those captured by the actual truth and other situations
which are logically possible scenarios. But then there are also other situations
we want to reason about, including impossible fictions, impossible theories,
alternative logical hypotheses, semantic hypotheses, situations with alterna-
tive mathematics, and so on. We want to allow that we can make sense
of alternative logics, or “illogical” belief systems, or surreal fictional worlds,
while at the same time keeping our logical moorings. And I think this is fea-
sible while staying monistic about logic: one system of deductive validity can
be recognised, while not treating everything we can sensibly reason about as
closed under our favourite logic.
The way to do this is to treat a lot of our reasoning about the “irrational”,
“illogical”, “paradoxical” and so on as implicitly in the scope of hyperinten-
sional operators. In particular, I think we should carefully distinguish de-
duction in the scope of a conditional from deduction outside the scope of a
2017.
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conditional. Suppose I want to reason informatively about an inconsistent
scenario-for example, one where naive set theory is correct-even though I
think logic rules out inconsistencies. A straightforward option would be to
list some starting points as premises, and use logic to derive conclusions.
(This is, I take it, what Routley advocates, though he holds of course that
we should adopt a logic that does not rule out all inconsistencies.) Another
way is to reason from some conditionals to others. “If naive set theory is
true, then the Russell set is a member of itself and not a member of itself”,
therefore “If naive set theory is true, then there is at least one inconsistent
set”, for example. However, concluding from the premise “If naive set theory
is true, all sets are members of themselves” would be a bad piece of reason-
ing, when we are trying to consider naive set theory sympathetically. To put
it in the (optional) language of reasoning situations, we can reason about
inconsistent reasoning situations without using premises or conclusions that
are themselves inconsistent: and we can do so without going metalinguistic
either. (The antecedents in this example are about the truth of a theory, but
more cumbersome antecedents which are just the conjunctions of an axioma-
tisation of naive set theory would do as well.) Of course, to do this, we need
a hyperintensional understanding of the relevant conditionals, so we cannot
substitute necessary equivalents (or even logical equivalents) willy-nilly into
antecedents or consequents.
Once we allow ourselves to reason in this conditional fashion about im-
possibilities, we can extend ourselves even further, and treat reasoning under
a supposition, or hypothetical reasoning, as functioning the same way as rea-
soning in the scope of a conditional. In Nolan 1997 pp 555-559 I suggest that
we can model hypothetical reasoning as reasoning in the scope of counterfac-
tual conditionals. To parallel the above case, imagine I reasoned by saying
“suppose naive set theory were true. Then the Russell set is a member of
itself and not a member of itself. So at least one set is a member of itself and
not a member of itself”. One way to understand what has happened is that
the effect of the reasoning is much the same as before: I have not categorically
supported the conclusion that at least one set is a member of itself and not a
member of itself: instead, the force of my conclusion is captured by “if naive
set theory were true, at least one set is a member of itself and not a member
of itself”. Exactly what the connection between this sort of supposition and
counterfactual conditionals is could be a subject of some further dispute: do
we merely model reasoning employing a supposition with counterfactuals?
Or are the counterfactuals the logical form of suppositional reasoning? Or
something else? Whatever exactly it is, if it has the same logical strength
as the corresponding counterfactuals, it does not require us to expand our
logic so that naive set theory is genuinely logically possible: it merely ob-
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tains in situations we can reason about conditionally, or suppositionally, or
hypothetically.
One advantage this approach has over the proposal to count e.g. naive
set theory as holding in a non-trivial situation closed under a universal logic,
is that this account generalises better. Routley allows naive set theory is
non-trivial and logically possible, but he holds that other logical and math-
ematical proposals violate his ultralogic. If we want to reason about what
the situations where it can be that A & ∼ A but fail to be that A, we
cannot find non-trivial situations closed under Routley’s preferred logics like
that. But we can apply the strategy I propose of reasoning conditionally or
suppositionally about such hypotheses: and given appropriate background,
it would be correct to reject the transition from “If (A and not-A) is the case
but conjunction elimination fails for the case of (A and not- A), then A and
not-A” to “If ( A and not-A) is the case but conjunction elimination fails for
the case of (A and not-A ), then A”. Routley can of course take situations
that are not closed under conjunction elimination to be “non-deductive”,
and perhaps even reason about them conditionally: but it seems he does not
have a unified account of different apparently counter-logical cases, since he
expands his logic to allow for the possibility of one case but must treat the
other in a very different way.
You might worry that this conditionals-heavy approach to reasoning with
theories sketched above throws the baby out with the bathwater: have I
been left with too little for categorical, non-hypothetical, logic to do? I
think not, for two reasons. One job for non-hypothetical logic to do is to
tell us which transitions from which are genuinely truth-preserving (in virtue
of logical form, etc. etc.), and this seems to me a topic of great logical
interest whatever else we might investigate. The second is that as well as
hypothetical reasoning, we also employ categorical reasoning: we reason from
premises we take to be in fact correct, in an attempt to reach conclusions that
are in fact correct. When we seek sound deductive reasoning, and not merely
valid transitions, it is often because we are after conclusions that are correct
and fit for belief. Non-hypothetical reasoning is the standard we should be
responsive to when attempting to reason soundly from premises we take to
be true.
We can keep some proof-theoretically strong principles in our logic and
nevertheless have devices for representing reasoning about logically strange
situations, provided we have conditionals that tolerate logically strange an-
tecedents and consequents without misbehaving or going trivial. Condition-
als and suppositional or hypothetical reasoning are among the most powerful,
but others may have a role in particular cases. When using deductive meth-
ods about what a reasoner believes, for example, we could take some of their
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belief contents as premises and deduce propositions from them that we also
attribute as beliefs. That will often make sense in practice: if someone stand-
ing in front of a house believes that if there is no barking, there is no dog
inside, and they believe there is no barking, it is normally safe to predict
that they believe there is no dog inside as well. But it is unlikely to be an
exceptionless method: people’s beliefs are not always, or perhaps ever, closed
under logical consequence in general. Instead, it is better to take as premises
e.g. “Anna believes there is no barking” and “Anna believes that if there is
no barking, there is no dog inside”, plus ancillary principles of psychology
and facts about Anna, to yield the prediction “Anna believes there is no dog
inside”. In general, many interesting operators will not have their contents
closed under logical consequence: and for many of them, it it is implausible
that they are closed under logical consequence even if the logic is as weak as
Routley’s ultralogic.
My guess is that Routley would complain that a logic of the sort I prefer,
relying heavily on hyperintensional operators, would not be general enough,
since it would not cover every “deductive reasoning situation”. As we have
seen above, Routley himself concedes that his preferred ultralogic will not
cover every situation about which we might want to reason: he admits there
are interesting “non-deductive reasoning situations” as well as deductive
ones. So whether the option sketched in this section is general enough will
likely turn on the question of when we are allowed to think that a “situa-
tion” of interest is not closed under logical consequence, and when we have
to accept that it is. One place where such a disagreement might play out
concerns the “situations” we consider in counterfactual reasoning. The ap-
proach I favour does not insist that these are closed under any interesting
logic, and this will be reflected by the behaviour of transitioning between
counterfactuals which share an antecedent: very few inferences of the form
A → B, therefore A → C will be formally valid. (Perhaps none besides the
case where B is the same as C: see Nolan 1997 p 547-554). If all the situa-
tions relevant to counterfactual evaluations were closed under an “ultralogic”
(at least one that went beyond the identity inference), then one would expect
that inferences of the form A→ B therefore A→ C would be valid whenever
C was a logical consequence of B.
Ironically, the approach I prefer is the approach Routley himself adopted
towards the “reasoning situations” created by discussion of fiction. One sit-
uation we often face is taking some claims we hold are true according to a
fiction, and reasoning from them to others that we conclude are true accord-
ing to a fiction. (Sherlock Holmes lives in London, Watson lives in London,
therefore Holmes and Watson live in the same place, for example.) Given
this phenomenon, you might initially expect Routley to think that our ul-
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tralogic should not find any counterexamples among the transitions we make
when reasoning about fictional matters, even when dealing with fictions that
we might traditionally have thought were “badly behaved” logically. After
all, ultralogic should not have counterexamples in any deductive reasoning
situation, whether or not that reasoning involves literal truths.
Instead, Routley denies that fictions, in general, are closed under any
interesting logical operations (Routley 1979 p 10-11). He does think that
there will be a set of logical principles that can be used when dealing with
“usual works of fiction” (p 11), but in full generality there is very little that
follows as a matter of logic about what else is true according to a fiction,
given a claim that is true according to a fiction. (Formally, if we let O be
an operator for “it is true according to the fiction that”, from O(A) almost
nothing follows as a matter of logic about whether O(B), where B is not
the same formula as A.) “[T]here is no general uniform logic of fiction”,
Routley says (Routley 1979 p 10, italics Routley’s). In particular, Routley
argues that the principle O(A & B) → O(A) will fail, in full generality (p
11). The reason Routley gives is that authors can create stories that violate
any usual principles: his counterexample for O(A & B) → O(A) is a story
where connexive logics are correct (and they allow for counterexamples to the
entailment of A from A & B, while Routley’s preferred ultralogical options
treat that transition as valid).
I agree with Routley about this aspect of the logic of fictions: fictions can
be arbitrarily strange and logically anarchic. I am tempted to treat a lot of
not-explicitly-prefixed reasoning about fictional matters as implicitly prefixed
by something like an “according to the fiction” operator, and allow that very
little of that reasoning, so understood, is logically valid as opposed to non-
deductively strong in virtue of background information we have about how
the particular fiction at hand works. But Routley’s willingness to treat fic-
tional situations as not universally closed under an ultralogic leaves Routley
in a slightly awkward dialectical situation. He demands that all “deductive
reasoning situations” be closed under logic, but has no obvious criteria for
which apparently deductive reasoning situations are genuinely “deductive
reasoning situations” and which are “non-deductive” apart from the appar-
ently circular one of checking to see whether the situation is closed under
logic. When fiction appears to provide counterexamples to his ultralogic, it
turns out some fictional situations we reason about are “non-deductive” after
all.
At present, I do not see a way to motivate the distinction Routley wants
between deductive and non-deductive reasoning situations that draws the line
where he appears to want to draw it. (Routley assures us that the class of
deductive situations is “independently and naturally determined” (Routley
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1980a p 898), but does not say much more about how, except by reference
to which situations are closed under the correct ultralogic.) Without such
a motivation, there does not seem to be any cogent objection to treating a
wide range of puzzle cases the way Routley wants to treat fiction: as not
being in general closed under any interesting logic, and playing a role in our
reasoning via reasoning implicitly prefixed by hyperintensional operators.
There is another, more serious concern about the approach of treating
the logic of hypothetical reasoning in the way I suggest that Routley would
also no doubt raise. For a logic to be paradox-free, it should at least not take
us from true premises to logically unacceptable conclusions. Even if we are
equipped with a system that allows us, for example, to reason about a story
containing a naive truth theory without treating that story as trivial, when
it comes time to deal with the Liar paradox we cannot just accept all the
premises of an argument that the Liar is both true and false, together with
principles that would allow us to in turn infer unacceptable consequences
from this, or even infer triviality from a contradiction. So even after we have
helped ourselves to a wide range of ultramodal operators with various exotic
properties, we must still return to the traditional stock of logical paradoxes
and explain how we can maintain appealing logical principles while avoid-
ing absurd consequences. The fact that we can handle logically unusual
situations in hypothetical reasoning without compromising cherished logical
principles would be no help if it were shown that there are actual counterex-
amples to those principles.
I do not have an all-purpose solvent for logical paradoxes to hand, and I
admit that even after we have a satisfactory counterpossible conditional of
the sort I have indicated, serious questions remain about the rest of the log-
ical resources we might accept. The correct solution to semantic paradoxes,
or paradoxes of vagueness, or other paradoxes where the problem might be
logical, may be to endorse a logic that lacks many of the inferences or the-
orems that are classically valid. If avoiding paradoxes required a logic for
non-hypothetical reasoning that could be applied as-is to a sufficiently wide
range of reasoning with impossible premises and in drawing out consequences
of those premises, then that would be an important argument for that ap-
proach over a logic that was not greatly revised in light of the paradoxes and
and handles exotic cases using an apparatus of hyperintensional operators
(e.g. counterfactuals to represent hypothetical reasoning). So my preferred
approach holds out a hostage to fortune in aiming for solutions to a range of
paradoxes that are not too logically revisionary.
Note that introducing new hyperintensional operators is likely to raise
new logical paradoxes as well, either due to those operators by themselves or
the interaction between them and resources already in our formal languages.
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 3.8
427
Examples include Fitch’s knowability paradox, Kaplan’s cardinality paradox
for combining modal and intentional operators in general (Kaplan 1995),
Lo¨b’s paradox for provability predicates, and so on. I have argued that a
suitable hyperintensional conditional can avoid the associated Curry paradox
(Nolan 2016), but other operators that we would want in our language, such
as a sentential connective to signal validity of inference, will bring with them
Curry paradoxes that are hard to solve (see e.g. Beall and Murzi 2013).
A final concern is whether the principles governing what inferences can be
drawn within the scope of these hyperintensional operators should count as
part of “logic” at all. Some conceptions of logic see it as general and domain-
neutral: but the distinctive principles a “logic of belief” concerns only one
narrow part of human psychology, for example. The principles governing an
“according to fiction X” operator seem to have even narrower application,
and so on. To some extent this is perhaps a matter of terminology: similar
issues were raised about whether modal logic is “logic”, given its relatively
restricted subject matter. What we have are interesting connections between
formal, syntactically specifiable, properties of a language and what inferences
are truth-preserving. Whether we want to call that system a “logic” or not,
we would like to have a good theory of the formally specifiable correct rules
of inference for use with a “believes that” construction, or a “true according
to” construction, or for that matter sentential operators corresponding to
“necessarily” or “possibly”. Whether we treat the resulting theories as part
of “logic” proper or part of an inquiry in the philosophy of language may not
matter very much for anything other than institutional and sub-discipline-
boundary-policing purposes.
A different concern about the “logical” status of hyperintensional oper-
ators (“believes that”, “says that”, “grounds”, etc.) is that there may not
be very many interesting formal principles that govern inferences they cru-
cially contribute to. Given that A believes one thing, there may not be
much else we can logically deduce about what else A believes, for example,
though there may be psychological regularities to be discovered. Likewise,
even if there are general regularities about what grounds what, or what ex-
plains what, these might best be seen as no business of logic. The concern
about whether formally stateable principles governing these operators are
genuinely “parts of logic” may end up being terminological: just as a de-
bate about whether the axioms of arithmetic are, or are not, part of “logic”
can be rather sterile in the abstract. The concern that there will be few
formally stateable inferences that are truth-preserving and which crucially
rely on these operators is less likely to be a mere terminological concern. I
suspect with some popular hyperintensional operators, there are not many
distinctive, formally characterised inferences that involve them: “according
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to the fiction...”, “believes that...”, or even “it is obligatory that...” may
not license many distinctive inferences which are formally stateable, suitably
general, and counterexample-less. It still seems to me worth debating how
these operators contribute to valid deductive inference, and whether there
are interesting truths of the sort one usually expects from a logic: but it may
turn out that the “logic” of these operators is very weak, contrary to what is
assumed by many who write on “doxastic logic” or “the logic of fiction” or
“deontic logic”, and so on. But in my book very weak logics are logics too.
4 Conclusion
Coming up with a single go-anywhere logic remains an appealing goal, and
ensuring that it does not fall to logical paradoxes and does not conflate nec-
essary equivalents are both hard to disagree with. However, I think the
best way forward towards those goals looks very different from Routley’s.
We need to be able to deductively reason non-trivially and successfully even
about hypothetical situations where principles we might ordinarily accept
have broken down. Likewise, and leaving aside the controversial talk of situ-
ations, we need to be able to make non-trivial sense of bodies of information
that are not closed under logical principles that we favour. But this is not
best done by weakening our logic until those bodies of information are closed
under the logic we end up endorsing.
Instead, when we want to reason when engaged with these bodies of
information we should employ “ultramodal” or hyperintensional operators:
and we should be prepared to analyse reasoning where these operators are
not on the surface as implicitly involving them. In the case of hypothetical
reasoning about apparently logically impossible theories, this can be done by
reinterpreting the reasoning as being in the scope of conditionals: instead of
deductions from one part of the theory to consequences of it, it is instead
reasoning from premises about what would be the case if the theory were true
to conclusions concerning what would be the case if the theory were true.
In the case of reasoning about the goings-on in impossible fictions, we can
reconstruct the reasoning as taking us from claims of the form “according to
the fiction, P” to claims of a similar form, yielding other claims about what
is true according to the fiction. The need to explore apparently impossible
or illogical alternatives is no reason to weaken our logic pre-emptively.
We have no guarantee that there will be a universal canon of deductive
validity, though it seems to me reasonable to hope that one will be available,
and to adopt that aim in our logical theorising, if only for the pragmatic
reason that if we find we cannot have such a universal canon the reason for
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our failure will point the way to what to try instead. We should not try to
find a logic that will apply directly to every “reasoning situation”, however:
instead, we should expect that there are many cases where reasoning should
be reconstructed as implicitly happening in the scope of hyperintensional
operators. This general suggestion needs to be fleshed out further: though
my discussion of hypothetical reasoning and the case of “according to the
fiction” operators can stand as two examples. We should expect of a logic
with universal pretensions that it can be a standard for all valid deductive
reasoning that occurs, even when we consider hypotheticals, or fictions, or
rival solutions to paradoxes, or other contents that take us well beyond the
logically possible.10
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